The growth of the market for patents has drawn the attention of innovation management scholars and policymakers to the impact this market may have on innovation. One of their prominent questions is whether firms exploit the market for patents to obtain strategic benefits over their market rivals, which may aggravate ex-post patent holdup and increase the cost of innovation.
Introduction
The patent market can improve social welfare. For instance, when patent ownership is transferred from inventors to those who can enforce the patents better, this reduces unnecessary patent infringement lawsuits and associated costs (Galasso et al., 2013) while it compensates inventors for underutilized inventions (Ferrill, 2004; Kremer, 1998) .
Transacting title to a patent is a way of transferring technology (Arora, 1997; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Jeong et al., 2013) . The technology market enhances the efficiency of the innovation process by promoting the division of innovative labor and diffusion of technology (Arora, 1997; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2004 Arora et al., , 2013 . As such, active patent ownership transfer for technology transactions can help innovation.
However, firms may trade patents for the strategic exploitation of the patent exclusion right, without having the intention to market the patented invention. As many studies show, firms use patents as a defensive bargaining chip for settling patent infringement disputes (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Thumm, 2004; Ziedonis, 2004) , or to deter competitors' market entry (Cohen et al., 2000; Motohashi, 2008) . Hence, patent ownership transfer is not necessarily a result of technology transactions (see, Figueroa and Serrano, 2013; Galasso et al., 2013; Kelley, 2011; Morton and Shapiro, 2014; Monk, 2009 ) but part of a firm's intellectual property strategy as such.
So how does patent ownership transfer for the strategic use of patent exclusion rights affect a firm's innovative activity? The literature on patent holdup and firms' defensive use of patents both hint at the answer: it depends on which firm acquires the patents and whether the firm is at risk of the patent holdup by the patents of interest. When the patents are acquired by a rival firm that has stakes in the opportunistic use of patents against the focal firm, the focal firm is likely to suffer from an increased patent holdup risk. Once the firm is exposed to a greater level of patent holdup risk, the firm produces less and makes inefficient R&D investments, as the patent holdup hypothesis asserts (Galetovic et al., 2015; Lemley and Shapiro, 2006) . On the other hand, a firm's preemptive patents' purchase immunizes the firm to the probable patent holdup that would occur if the patents were to be purchased first by another firm. Such defensive preemptive patent purchase strategy has been a foundation of the business of defensive patent aggregator (Cosandier et al., 2014; Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013; Morton and Shapiro, 2014; Kwon and Drev, 2017) . equipment company).
There are three findings in this paper. First, this study shows that, theoretically, a firm can significantly enhance its profits when it leverages the patent holdup risk of its market competitors using the purchased patents. This benefit becomes an economic incentive for the focal firm's acquisition of external patents.
Second, if a firm's patent purchase imposes a greater patent holdup risk on its rival, the rival's R&D outcome for technologies related to the patent is negatively impacted. The patent holdup theory explains this finding.
Third, the negative impact of a firm's patent purchase on its rival's R&D outcome disappears over time. I explain this finding with the notion of a working solution, coined by Walsh et al. (2003) .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I review the patent holdup literature, focusing on how it does deter innovation. In section 3, by constructing a simple analytical model which captures the relationship between patent transfer and a firm's downstream market competition, I explain how benefits from the strategic exploitation of patent holdup risk of a rival firm can incentivize a firm to purchase patents. By incorporating the patent holdup theory into the model, I rationalize how a firm's patent purchase increases the patent holdup risk of its rival and influences the rival's R&D outcomes thereafter. In section 4, I describe the data and my empirical research design. Section 5 presents the findings, and in Section 6, I discuss their implications.
Section 7 concludes by suggesting avenues for future research in this area.
Patent Holdup and Innovation
In general, the holdup is likely to occur when the following three elements are intertwined: an essential input to a firm's production is owned by other firms; the focal firm's asset-specific investment in that input; and the opportunistic behavior of the input's owner.
Suppose that firm A makes a product, and firm B owns an input for firm A's production. Firm A may have contracted with firm B for the use of the input in production. Firm A makes the input-specific investment, which becomes a sunk cost if firm B no longer provides the input. By leveraging this risk, firm B may initiate an ex-post negotiation after firm A made the input-specific investment and product, which forces firm A to pay a higher rent to firm B than the ex-ante rent to continue to use the input. Expecting this situation, firm A becomes reluctant to invest in acquiring assets that have specificity to the input. In an extreme case, firm A's production can break down.
This holdup situation can happen through opportunistic patent enforcement. Because a patent grants the owner the legal right to exclude others from using the patented invention, the owner can leverage the patent holdup risk to extract an excessive rent fee from firms that use the patented invention. These firms become more vulnerable to ex-post patent holdup if they have invested in assets that have specificity to the patents at holdup risk (Lemley and Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2010) .
The opportunistic leverage of an ex-post patent holdup risk has been blamed for discouraging innovation because firms that are exposed to the patent holdup will be reluctant to make optimal R&D investments (Bessen, 2004) . Even more seriously, given the cumulative nature of modern innovation (Scotchmer, 2004) , patent holdups can limit innovators' access to essential technologies for creating follow-on innovation. This undesirable consequence could be particularly acute in complex technology fields (Shapiro, 2010) or where standard-essential patents (SEPs) become crucial input for production (Farrell et al., 2007; Galetovic et al., 2015; Miller, 2007) . Other theoretical studies raise similar concerns using different terms to refer to patent holdup, such as the tragedy of anticommons and the patent thicket, which emphasize the detrimental impact of patent ownership fragmentation and the accompanying excessive cost of using patented technologies for innovation.
According to Heller and Eisenberg (1998) , the tragedy of anticommons can emerge when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use (p. 698). In this situation, the cost of acquiring the necessary patented technology for production can easily exceed the genuine value of the product while increasing incidents of patent infringements. A similar concern was raised by Shapiro (2010) with the concept of the patent thicket, which is defined as a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through to commercialize new technology (p.120). As the patent thicket that a company faces becomes denser, the cost to clear the patent thicket increases. Given that a firm's existing patented inventions can be used as inputs for another firm's R&D activity, a dense patent thicket can significantly restrict firms' innovative activities.
Interestingly, empirical studies report mixed findings on the detrimental effects of the patent holdup on innovation. Walsh et al. (2003) investigate whether patent holdup hampers R&D in the biomedical industry. Surprisingly, the study does not find evidence in support of the tragedy of anti-commons hypothesis. Instead, it suggests that firms equip themselves to cope with the patent holdup. A study by Galetovic et al. (2015) examines whether R&D activities in sectors in which SEPs are crucial are negatively impacted by patent holdup. Their study shows no empirical evidence that SEP holdup negatively impacts their overall R&D activity.
In contrast, a study by Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) finds empirical evidence showing that patent thickets impose difficulties to startup operations. Their analysis demonstrates that startups in sectors where dense patent thickets exist experience a greater delay in acquiring venture capital funding than firms that are in sectors with less dense patent thickets. Their study also shows that start-ups in sectors with a dense patent thicket are less likely to have initial public offerings than those in sectors that are not characterized by dense patent thickets.
A subsequent study by Cockburn et al. (2010) which used survey data on the innovative activities of German firms, shows that the relationship between a firm's innovation performance and the patent thicket depends on the firm's patent licensing activity. Specifically, they find that the innovation performance of firms is negatively correlated with the denseness of the patent thicket when the firms are engaging in in-licensing activity. However, the relationship was positive for firms that do not engage in in-licensing.
These mixed findings summarized above are partly explained by the ways firms cope with patent thickets or patent holdups. As Walsh et al. (2003) explain, because entities develop strategies to cope with the probable patent holdup problem, they can mitigate its detrimental impact on their R&D to some extent. Shapiro (2000) and Bessen (2003) suggest similar ideas. They argue that patent-oriented strategic instruments, such as patent pooling or cross-licensing, can resolve the problems associated with patent thickets. Likewise, Cockburn et al. (2010) show that the impact of the patent thicket on a firm's R&D is dependent upon the firm's patent licensing activity, which supports the idea that patent holdup risk can be managed strategically.
Model
What is the nature of the strategic benefits that a firm can gain over its market competitor when it exploits the patent holdup risk of the rival firm? How, if at all, does such a benefit incentivize the focal firm's external patents acquisition?
Suppose that there are three firms. Firm 1 and firm 2 are symmetric and in downstream market competition. They produce imperfectly substitutable products. The product substitutability is parameterized into θ ∈ [0, 1]. Firm 1 faces the inverse demand curve p 1 = a − b(q 1 + θq 2 ) while firm 2 faces p 2 = a − b(q 2 + θq 1 ) where a and b are positive numbers (Bowley, 1924) . When θ is 0, each firm faces its market demand whereas they engage in duopolistic market competition with a perfectly substitutable product if θ = 1. For simplicity, I assume that firm 1 and firm 2 both have the constant marginal production cost, c. Firm 3 owns a patent for an essential technological input for the two other firms' production, while firm 3 competes with neither of them in the downstream market. The product substitutability, the inverse demand curves, and the marginal production cost are common information.
When firm 3 keeps the patents
Initially, firm 1 and firm 2 are presumed to receive licenses to the patents owned by firm 3. In return, firm 3 earns a certain fraction (i.e., royalty rate r) of firm 1 and firm 2's market revenues as the licensing fee. Given r, firm 1 and firm 2 maximize their profits as follows;
In quantity competition, firm 1 and 2 produceq i = a(1−r)−c b(2+θ)(1−r) . Given the two firms' best responses, firm 3 decides r to maximize its profit as follow:
where π 0 is the market profit of firm 3, which is independent from firm 1 and firm 2's market operation. Firm 3 charges r such that ∂π 3 ∂r = 0.
When the patent is transferred to firm 1(or 2)
Consider that firm 3 sells patents to either firm 1 or firm 2. For simplicity, suppose that firm 1 becomes the new owner of the patent. With r now given by firm 1, firm 1 and firm 2 decide their optimal production level, by solving the following profit maximization problems;
Firm 1 and firm 2's conditional best responses areq 1 = a−c−bq 2 θ(1+r) 2b
,q 2 =
(1−r)(a−bθq 1 )−c 2b(1−r)
. Firm 1 decides r to maximize its profit, givenq 1 andq 2 .
This model accommodates the concepts of revenue effect and rent dissipation effect of patent licensing (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2004 Arora et al., , 2013 Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Kani and Motohashi, 2012; Motohashi, 2008) . Revenue effect refers to the royalty revenue that the patent owner can obtain by licensing owning patent to other firms. Rent dissipation effect refers to the patent holder's profit loss due to the licensee's market operation with the licensed patent. The rent dissipation effect increases in the intensity of downstream market competition between the patent holder and the licensee.
In the profit function of firm 1, −bθq 2 captures the rent dissipation effect because it corresponds to the loss of market revenue of firm 1 by the rival's market operation with the licensed patent.
rq 2 (a − bq 2 − bθq 1 ) captures the revenue effect because it is the rent revenue that firm 1 obtains from firm 2 as a result of licensing.
Comparative Analysis
For non-linearity of the system equations, I find numerical solutions, setting a = 5, b = 1, and c = 1 with variation in θ from 0 to 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Royalty rate. The first panel (Northwest) of Fig 1 profiles the optimal level of r that the patent holder will charge to licensees before (black solid) and after (blue solid) the patent transfer.
First, in both cases, r increases in θ. This indicates that the greater intensity of market competition between firm 1 and firm 2, the larger that the royalty fee charged by the patent holder will be.
Second, if firm 1 becomes the new patent owner, when θ is sufficiently large, the royalty rate that firm 1 will charge firm 2 becomes substantially greater than what was charged by firm 3. This indicates that if firm 1 and firm 2 are close enough in the downstream market space, firm 1's patent purchase and the probable re-negotiation for licensing will impose a greater royalty cost on firm 2.
Profit. The second panel (Northeast) of Fig 1 plots firm 1 and firm2's maximized level of profits by θ when firm 2 continues to receive the license at the given royalty rate r. After firm 1 purchases the patent, it earns more profit (blue solid) than firm 2 (red solid) when 0 < θ < 1. If the patent on the technology does not exist (green dashed), firm 1's profit when it purchases the patent from firm 3 is greater than that when the two firms are in typical duopolistic market competition.
Firm 1's profit if it owns the patent also exceeds its monopolistic market profit (gray solid). These findings indicate that firm 1 has an economic incentive to purchase the patent as long as firm 1 can compel firm 2 to pay to license the patent at the desired royalty rate.
The improvement of firm 1's profit originates from the fact that firm 1 becomes capable of internalizing the externality of its rival's market operation through enforcement of the patent license.
In doing so, firm 1 can manipulate firm 2's production level while gaining rent revenue. In contrast, firm 3 has no stakes in increasing the royalty rate as high as firm 1 will, because imposing excessive rent reduces the market revenue of the licensees and it curtails the royalty revenue for firm 3 accordingly while doing so gives no benefits in downstream market competition. Patents selection for purchase. The comparative statistics reveal that there is an economic incentive for a firm to purchase patents if this firm can compel rival firms to pay to license these 1 The fact that the calculated maximum WTP of firm 1 to purchase the patent decreases as θ increases, should not be interpreted as the greater the market competition between firms 1 and 2, the lower firm 1's incentive to purchase the patents. This is because the small value of θ means that firm 1 and firm 2 are in significantly different market. If firm 1 compels firm 2 that is in a different market to receive the license on firm 1's patent, firm 1 effectively earn the market profit from own market operation and firm 2's market operation, which double the profit size.
patents at the desired royalty rate. Leveraging the patent holdup risk of rival firms makes it possible to compel the rivals to pay. Thus, the focal firm has an incentive for purchasing patents that allow the firm to leverage its rivals' ex-post patent holdup risk.
3.4 Impact of patent ownership transfer on rival's R&D outcome
How does a firm's patent purchase impact the rival's R&D outcome if the patent transfer imposes a greater risk of patent holdup on the rival?
Consider that firm 1 and 2 make products by combining two technological elements, E1 and E2. E1 is the group of technologies that are substitutable for or have technological dependency on the patents that are purchased by firm 1. The patents of interest cover h-technologies for E1. E2
is for technologies that do not depend on the patents. The number of technologies that the firm obtains for E1 and E2 for production is x and y, respectively.
I model the firm's production function into a Cobb-Douglas function of x and y, (i.e., q(x, y) =
A 0 x α y β ). I assume that other inputs for production such as labor or capital are independent of the patents transfer. The firm pays P x and P y for developing one unit of technology of E1 and E2, respectively. For comparative statistics, I set P y = 1.
Before the patent ownership transfer. Firm 1 and firm 2 were presumed to receive licenses on the patent from firm 3 before the patent transfer. Firm 1 and firm 2's optimal production levels are determined by the result of market competition between them with firm 3's gvien rate of royalty r * 0 . For firm 2, this rate of royalty determines the desired level of x and y by solving the following cost minimization problem:
where q * 10 and q * 20 are firm 1 and firm 2's optimal production level before the patent ownership transfer. The solutions are
. Firm 2's relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2 is λ * 0 :
After the patent-transfer. After the patent is transferred to firm 1, firm 2 expects that its optimal production level will decrease if it continues to pay to license to the patent.
If the patented technology is substitutable by other patented technologies of E1, firm 2 considers two options: keep paying to license the patent from firm 1 at the increased rate of royalty or inventing around the patent.
When firm 2 chooses to pay for the license, firm 2 continues to use h-technologies for E1. In return, the firm pays royalties at the given rate r * L to firm 1 while the production level changes to q * 2L . Then, firm 2 decides x and y by solving the cost minimization problem as it did when it was paying to license h-technologies from firm 3. The solutions are
and λ * L < λ * 0 .
If firm 2 chooses to invent-around, the firm develops all the necessary technologies for E1 and E2 through internal R&D. Doing so frees firm 2 from a license contract with firm 1, but making firm 2 face the greater internal R&D cost for E1 (P z ) due to the probable difficulties on inventing around h-technologies. Firm 2 solves the following cost minimization problem:
The solutions are
In this case, q * 2D > q * 20 because firm 1 and firm 2 face typical duopolistic competition without patent licensing (shift from black dashed to green dashed line in the panel on southeast of Fig 1) .
otherwise. This indicates that if the increased R&D cost of inventing around the patent is large enough (i.e., exceeds the cutoffP x ), firm 2's relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2 decreases as a result of the patents transfer to firm 1. It can be expected that λ * D increases due to the patents transfer if the cost of inventing around the patent is not that large. This case does not fall into the situation where patent holdup is likely to occur.
This consequence is caused by the fact that firm 1's patents purchase affects the marginal production cost of firm 2. When firm 2 continues to license the patents from firm 1, it faces increased royalty rates while having a greater R&D cost if firm 2 invents around firm 1's patent.
Therefore, as long as firm 1 can compel firm 2 to continue paying to license the patents if the cost for replacing the patented technology is excessively high, firm 1's patent purchase negatively impacts firm 2's relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2.
What if the patent of interest is essential and not substitutable by other technologies of E1? The patent holdup theory asserts that if a patent that covers essential input for production is owned by other entity who may exploit the patent holdup risk of the rival firm, this rival firm becomes reluctant to acquire the technologies that depend on the patent at holdup risk.
As shown in section 3.3, firm 1 has the incentive to purchase patents if it can compel firm 2 to pay for the license on the patent at an increased royalty rate by leveraging firm 2's patent holdup risk. Doing so allows firm 1 to maneuver firm 2's market operation, which enhances firm 1's market profit. Then, firm 2 will be reluctant to engage in the R&D activity for obtaining technologies dependent on firm 1's-purchased patent, expecting holdup. Accordingly, firm 2's relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2 decreases.
The constructed model above draws the same conclusion. If the patent covers essential technology for firm 2's production, the cost of inventing around the patent will likely be excessively high (i.e., P z >>P x ). Hence, firm 2's relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2 decreases.
To summarize, firm 1's patent purchase can impose a greater level of ex-post patent holdup risk to firm 2, negatively impacting firm 2's relative R&D outcome for technologies dependent on the patent purchased by firm 1. More formally: If a firm's acquisition of external patent imposes a greater level of ex-post patent holdup risk on a rival, the rival's relative R&D outcome related to the transferred patent decreases.
Empirical Analysis

Nortel's patent auction in 2011
The empirical work is based on the case of Nortel's patent auction. Nortel, which was a Canadian telecommunication equipment company, tried to liquidate their patents (largely on telecommunication technology) for bankruptcy. Nortel opened a patents auction on June 27, 2011. In 2012, about half of Nortel's patents were redistributed to three member-companies of Rockstar (Apple, MS, and RIM). The remaining patents were transferred to either a patent assertion entity (i.e., Spherix Inc.) or a defensive patent aggregator (i.e., RPX Corp). None of the patents were re-transferred to Google or Intel.
This case is useful for testing the present study's hypothesis for the following reasons. First, the stakes were high for the auction participants in acquiring Nortel's patents over their competitors (Nicholson, 2011) 3 . Nortel owned many high-quality patents on communication technology, including SEPs that are crucial for making smart-devices. Most of the auction participants owned weak patent portfolios on communication technology and were exposed to the increasing patent infringement disputes during the so-called "era of smartphone patent war" (Lloyd et al., 2011) on communication technology patents (Chia, 2012; Raghu et al., 2008; Teece et al., 2014) . For this reason, they were desperate to strengthen their patent portfolio, especially for the communication technology patents. Nortel's patent auction was a unique opportunity to acquire such a large number of high-quality communication technology patents all at once.
Second, the auction bidders were mutual rivals in the smart-device market whereas, Nortel was not. Hence, Roackstar's winning bid for Nortel's patents became a rival's patent purchase to the losing-group,Rangers; This scenario fits the frame of the constructed model.
Third, the auction result was close to an external shock to the bidders because the result of the auction was difficult to predict. The fact that some bidders who ceased bidding at early stage could continue bidding later (e.g., Intel and Ericson Consortium) through unexpected partnerships with other leading bidders indicates how unpredictable the auction result was.
By capitalizing on these features, I identify the impact of the auction result on the R&D outcomes of the losing firms as opposed to the bid winners. I consider the winning group, Rockstar, as the comparison group to the bid losing group,Rangers, because the auction winners avoid being subject to Nortel's patents' ex-post patent holdup risk after the auction.
According to the derived hypothesis, the bid-losing firms face increased patent holdup risk through the auction result, which reduces the bid-losing firms' relative R&D outcomes for technologies that are related to Nortel's patents. Because patents filed by a firm can be used as a proxy for the R&D outcome of the firm (i.e., Griliches, 1990; Pakes and Griliches, 1984) , I test the hypothesis by examining the post-auction difference between the auction winners, the Rockstar firms, versus bid-losing firms, the Rangers firms in the patenting outcomes for the Nortel's patents relevant technology, using difference-in-differences (DiD) approach.
Data
Nortel's patents transferred to Rockstar
I began by identifying US patents that were transferred from Nortel to Rockstar in the patent assignment database provided by USPTO. My initial search found 4,129 patents. It is known that about 6,000 patents were transferred from Nortel to Rockstar through the auction. The discrepancy between these numbers is caused by the fact that the database does not contain information about pending patent applications and patents granted by non-US authorities.
I include granted utility patents in the sample while excluding patents that were filed after June 30, 2011. These procedures helped identify the patents that were actual subject to the auction. This sample contains 3,574 patents. Within the sample, 971, 218, and 210 patents were redistributed to Apple, MS, and RIM, respectively in 2012. Among the remaining patents, 2129 patents were resold to RPX, Rockstar (including its subsidiary) retained 41 patents, and Spherix Inc., which was known as a PAE,acquired ownership of five patents (see Fig 2) .
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Patents filed by the auction bidders
Next, I collected information about US granted utility patents that were filed by the auction participants from beginning four years before the auction and ending four years after its end date (i.e., July 1, 2007 -June 30, 2015 . These patents are divided into two groups. The first group, labeled WIN, is composed of the patents that were filed by the auction winners, who soon became the new owners of Nortel's patents: Apple, MS, and RIM. The other group, labeled LOSE, contains the patents that were filed by the two firms, Google and Intel which continued bidding until the final round but failed to acquire Nortel's patents. The sample is composed of multi-period crosssectional.
To identify the patents that were filed by these firms, I searched for patents for which the owners' names changed from a person's name to each firm's name through an Employer-Inventor type (EIT)
transaction. Because patent-ownership change through EIT is based upon contractual obligation between corporate inventors and the hiring firm (Marco et al., 2015) , the patents transferred through this type of transaction can be considered as patents that were originally filed by the focal firm 4 .
Detailed information about the patents was obtained from patenteview.org, serviced by USPTO.
Finally, information about the 42,871 US granted utility patents was retrieved. Each patent in this dataset becomes the unit of analysis. Under US patent law, initial patent ownership is conferred to inventors for patents that were filed before September 16th, 2012 (Pre-America Invent Acts). For patents filed in the post-AIA period, the patent applicant (either inventor or the employer of the inventor) can be the initial owner. Hence, patents that were transferred once to firms by Employer-Inventor type transactions can be considered as "patents" originally filed by the firms if the patents were filed before the AIA. However, for patents filed after AIA, it is difficult to identify the initial patent owner of the patents in the given database. This is due to the fact that the patent assignment database provides information about patent ownership transfer, whereas the official patent search database provided by USPTO gives information about the "current" patent owner. Due to this difficulty, I only retrieved patents that were transferred to the firm of interest through inventor-employer type transactions for the patents filed after AIA as well. Although this sampling strategy may capture only part of the population of filed patents by the firm of interest, cross-validation with a patent list obtained from a different data source (i.e., Derwent Innovation Index) shows that there is no substantial discrepancy in the number of retrieved patents. A patent citation is made when previously patented inventions limit the legal scope of the new invention in question (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Trajtenberg et al., 1997) . A patent citation also indicates that the pair of cited and citing patents are technologically interrelated (see, Jaffe and de Rassenfosse, 2017). Studies have also used patent citation as a proxy for technological linkage between cited and citing patents by considering it as a paper trail of knowledge flow (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993) . Second, I introduced a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the patent of interest was filed by a firm in the LOSE -group (LOSE ): this takes into consideration the difference in the dependent variable at T+0 between the WIN -and LOSE -groups.
Variables and Empirical Model
Third, I generated interaction terms between the time dummy variables and LOSE. The hypothesis anticipates statistically significant negative coefficients for LOSE × T + n, n > 0.
I fit the data to the logit model because the nature of the variable of interest is odd (i.e., λ, see the section 3.4). In the regression analysis, I used cluster standard errors by firms to take into account within-group correlation between patents by firms: patents that were filed by the same firm may have a systematic correlation with each other while differing from those filed by other firms. The following formula describes the specification of the econometric model.
where p i is the latent variable of the dependent variable for patent i, LOSE i takes the value of 1 if patent i was filed by a firm in the LOSE -group, T ji takes the value of 1 if patent i was filed in a jth period counted from the reference period, T : time dummy variables, and i is the error term.
Results
Descriptive Analysis
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that about 86% of Nortel's patents redistributed to the three member-companies of Rockstar are communication technology patents.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 shows the number of patents filed by each firm during the period of observation. The decreasing number of patents field begining in the 4th year after the auction is due to the delay in publishing and indexing patent applications in the patent assignment database.
[Insert Table 2 [Insert Figure 4 about here] show the estimated average marginal effect (AME).
Regression Analysis
[Insert Table 3 The coefficients of LOSE × T + 1 and LOSE × T + 3 are negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 significance level while the coefficient of LOSE × T + 2 is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. The estimated AME show that firms in the LOSE -group become 0.8%, 3.9%, and 3.7% points less likely to develop inventions that have technological overlap with Nortel's patents than that on the reference year, compared to firms in the WIN -group.
This observed effect seems to disappear gradually over time after the auction. The size of the coefficients of the post-auction interaction terms between the time dummy variables and LOSE between 2 and 4 years after the auction (LOSE × T + 2 to LOSE × T + 4) decreases, while the size of the coefficients for LOSE × T + 4 becomes statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level.
Robustness Check
Estimation without cluster standard error option
Correcting the standard-error (SE) using the typical cluster SE estimation procedure may result in over-rejection of the null hypothesis when there are few clusters in the data (Cameron and Miller, 2015) . To check the robustness of the findings to this potential problem, I conducted regression analysis without the cluster option.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Table 4 reports the results. The first two columns present the estimated logit and AME coefficients, employing Comm Tech as the dependent variable. The last two columns report the logit and AME coefficients, employing Tech Overlap as the dependent variable. The results are largely consistent with the main regression result.
Alternative indicators of technological overlap between patents
Tech Overlap is a composite variable created from two patent-citation based indicators -Direct cite and Shared reference. To check the robustness of the findings, I ran two separate regressions, employing each of the two binary variables as the dependent variable at a time.
[Insert Table 5 about here] Table 5 reports the results. The first two columns report the regression results employing Direct cite as the dependent variable. In the first column, the estimated logit coefficients of the interaction terms between the post-auction time dummy variables and LOSE (LOSE×T +2 and LOSE×T +3) are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. The estimated AME reported in the second column indicates that LOSE -group firms become 0.8 percentage points less likely to file patents that have a direct citation relation with Nortel's patents after the 2nd and 3rd year following the auction, compared to the WIN -group. However, this impact disappears begining the 4th year after the auction.
The last two columns report the regression results employing the shared reference as the dependent variable. In the third column, the estimated logit coefficients of the interaction terms between the post-auction time dummy variables and LOSE (from LOSE × T + 1 to LOSE × T + 3) stays negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. The estimated AME reported in the last column indicates that LOSE -group firms become a maximum 3.9 percentage points less likely to file patents that have technological overlap with Nortel's patents in the 2nd year after the auction, compared to the WIN -group firms. However, this impact disappears in the 4th year after the auction. The findings from the main regression are confirmed.
Placebo test
I examined how specific the findings are to the timing of the auction event using a placebo test. I [Insert Table 6 about here] 
Bootstrap standard error
The data consists of patents filed by five firms and they are regrouped into WIN and LOSE. Because the number of patents filed is heterogeneous across firms while data-points are nested at firm-level, estimation without considering this heterogeneity could bring bias toward firms that have filed a larger number of patents than other firms. If so, the finding from the base-line regression may only reflect a change in the R&D outcome of specific firms who filed a larger number of patents. One way of resolving this problem is to use a bootstrap cluster standard error estimation method (cluster at firm-level) (see, Duflo et al., 2011) . To use this method, I re-run the regression analysis while using the firm-level cluster bootstrap standard error with replacement-allowed 1000 re-sampling.
[Insert Table 8 about here] Table 8 presents the estimation results. The coefficients of interaction terms between the preauction time dummy variables and LOSE are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level; this indicates that the assumption of a pre-treatment parallel time trend of outcome variable for LOSE and WIN empirically holds. The estimated coefficients and statistical significance of the interaction terms between post auction time dummy variables and LOSE indicates that the regression result is largely consistent with that of main regression result.
Exploring alternative explanations
Self-selection
One may argue that the LOSE firms bid less for Nortel's patents than the WIN firms because the LOSE -group valued Nortel's patents less than the WIN -group did in the first place. This difference could lead to the LOSE -group's less active patenting activities on Nortel's patentsrelevant technology. If so, the present study's findings would be a mere consequence of self-selection rather than the result of patents acquisition by the WIN -group firms. However, the data does not support this argument. First of all, if this alternative argument was credible, substantially decreased patenting activity by the LOSE -group on the technology relevant to Nortel's patents is supposed to persist over time. My analysis clearly shows that the LOSE -group's patenting activity sharply bounced back from the second or third year after the auction, and the recovery seems to continue afterward. Second, the LOSE -group firms seem not to value Nortel's auctioned patents less than the WIN -group, since the LOSE -group's patenting activity on Nortel's patents-relevant technology was not lower than that of the WIN -group just before the auction. As readers can see in Table   3 , the coefficients of LOSE are either statistically insignificant or even positive with statistical significance. This indicates that the LOSE -group's patenting activity on Nortel's patents-relevant technology just before the auction is not smaller than or even higher than that of the WIN -group.
An unobserved event may have occurred to LOSE -group firms after the auction
The findings of this study could simply be caused by unobserved events that are irrelevant to the Nortel's patent auction during the post-auction period. If such event influenced on the LOSEgroup firms' patenting activities and R&D outcomes on communication technologies in general, the present study's findings might not represent the causal impact of Nortel's patent auction.
To rule out this alternative explanation, I designed a crucial test that examines the specificity of the findings to Nortel's auctioned patents over patents that were filed by a comparable firm with Nortel. If this competing explanation were credible, similar findings to those of the main regression results should be observed when examining the LOSE -group firms' likelihood of filing patents that technologically overlap with patents filed by another firm comparable to Nortel.
For this test, I employed Qualcomm's patents as the alternative set of patents to Nortel's auctioned patents, which are matched on patent application year and NBER subclass with Nortel's patents. This is due to the fact that, like Nortel, Qualcomm was not in market competition with the auction participants in the smart-device market; rather, Qualcomm was intensively developing communication technologies (Kang and Motohashi, 2015) . Indeed, Qualcomm has been a member of various telecommunication standard setting organizations such as ETSI, as Nortel also was 5 .
Using the replacement-allowed and one-to-one matching procedure, 1366 Qualcomm's patents were selected as the alternative set to Nortel's auctioned patents. Then, I regenerated the three variables-Tech Overlap, direct cite, and shared reference-for each patent that was filed by the auction bidders, replacing Nortel's auctioned patents with Qualcomm's patents. If the findings obtained from the main regression were not specific to Nortel's auctioned patents, but instead were the result of an irrelevant and unobserved event, I should be able to observe a decrease in the LOSE group firms' likelihood of filing patents that technologically overlap with Qualcomm's patents during the post-auction period. However, this is not the case.
[Insert Table 7 about here] Table 7 reports the results. The interaction terms between post-auction time dummy variables and LOSE are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 level, which does not support the alternative explanation.
Patent or Invention?
Firms decide whether or not to file patents on already developed inventions. Thus, the finding of the present study could be the result of a changed patenting behavior by the LOSE -group, rather than the result of decreased invention outcomes. More specifically, if, after the auction, the LOSEgroup decided not to file patents related to Nortel's auctioned patents, even if they had already developed inventions relevant to Nortel's auctioned patents before the auction, the finding of the present research may not indicate the changed R&D outcome of the LOSE -group, but simply a changed "patenting behavior."
One possible explanation is that a rival's acquisition of Nortel's patents may marginalize the utility of having one additional patent on an invention relevant to Nortel's auctioned patents for the LOSE -group. The LOSE -group may already have developed some inventions related to Nortel's auctioned patents well before the auction, so that patenting such inventions could have been strategically useful if the LOSE -group could obtain Nortel's patents. However, because Nortel's auctioned patents were acquired by the WIN-group, the incentive for filing patents on such inventions might have decreased.
To test the credibility of this alternative explanation, I conducted a crucial test by capitalizing on "continuation-patent applications" practice in the US patent system. In the US, a patent applicant can add new claims to a previously disclosed patented invention by filing so-called children patent applications as long as the previous patent application is not abandoned. By doing so, the patentee can extend the scope of protection of the patented invention ex-post facto. I consider the LOSEgroup's patents that were filed before auction and categorized into "telecommunication" or have technological overlap with Nortel's patents as a "body of inventions related to Nortel's patents" that were developed before the auction. Then, I examine how many "children-applications" of these patents were filed each year after the auction. If the suggested alternative explanation is credible, we would be likely to observe that the LOSE -group firms file fewer children applications in the years after the auction than in preceding years. In contrast, if the auction results negatively impacted the "inventive activities" of the LOSE -group for the inventions relevant to the Nortel's patents, the auction event is unlikely to influence the number of children patent applications in its aftermath, or the likelihood of filing the children patent applications for the patents filed before the auction.
To operationalize this test, I selected two groups of patents that were filed by the LOSE -group before the auction. One group is composed of patents that were filed between July 1st, 2006 and for the analysis. The number of children-patent applications for the patents that were filed within 1-year before the auction becomes the reference group. To additionally examine the change in the likelihood of filing the continuation applications, I also regress the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there was any type of children patent application to the patent of interest in the corresponding time window. Table 9 reports the OLS panel regression result.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
The first two columns report the OLS regression result using the number of continuation patent applications as the dependent variable. The interaction terms between the dummy variable for the "treatment-group" (Treat) and post-auction time dummy variables (T reat×T +1 and T reat×T +2)
is statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. The analysis result using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there was at least one child patent application to the patent of interest in the corresponding time window, is reported in third and fourth columns. The coefficients of Treat×T+1 and Treat×T+2 are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. Thus, the "changed-patenting behavior" hypothesis is rejected.
Evidence suggested by post-auction events
Is there any evidence showing that the firms in the LOSE -group experienced difficulties or increased costs of operation due to the auction result?
In 2013, Google and other smartphone manufacturers that employ the Android operating system were sued by Rockstar for alleged infringement on seven of Nortel's auctioned patents. Most of the lawsuit cases were settled in 2014.
Intel has not been sued for infringement on Nortel's patents after the auction. Instead, the [Insert Figure 6 about here]
Given that patent holdup risk often results in either patent infringement disputes or substantially increased costs for patent licensing, the described post-auction events and costs at Google and Intel seems to reasonably explain how the result of Nortel's patent auction imposed a greater level of patent holdup risk to the LOSE -group firms.
Discussion
This study sheds theoretical and empirical light on how a firm benefits from acquiring external patents through exploiting its rival's risk of ex-post patent holdup with the purchased patents. It also investigates what happens to rival firms' R&D outcomes if the focal firm's patents' purchase increases rival firms' patent holdup risk.
The constructed model demonstrates that a firm can effectively increase a rival firm's operating costs and earn more market profit by leveraging the rivals' patent holdup risk, which effectively manipulates the competitors' market operation. This benefit incentivizes the focal firm to purchase external patents.
The constructed model rationalizes that if a firm's patent purchase imposes a greater risk of ex-post patent holdup on its rival, the rival's R&D outcome on technology related to the patents purchased by focal firm is negatively affected.
I employ the case of Nortel's patent auction in 2011 for empirical analysis. According to the hypothesis derived from the present study's model, the auction-losing firms should have experienced substantially decreased R&D outcomes on technology that is related to Nortel's auctioned patents.
The analysis finds empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis-the firms in the auction-losing group (i.e., Google and Intel) became less productive in R&D for technology related to Nortel's auctioned patents than the auction-winning firms.
This impact did not persist for long, however. Although the auction-losing firms' R&D outcomes on technologies relevant to Nortel's patents immediately dropped after the auction, these firms recovered a few years after.
I explain this finding by referencing firms' post auction efforts to cope with an increased risk of the ex-post patent holdup. Immediately after Nortel's patent auction, Google announced that it planned to merge with Motorola Mobility 9 . Given that Motorola Mobility owned a sizable patent portfolio for communication technology, Google's merger announcement was believed to be a strategic response to its increased risk of the ex-post patent holdup created by Nortel's patent auction result. Intel also put an effort to acquire external patents on communication technologies after the auction. For instance, in 2014, Intel announced that it would purchase about 1,400 telecommunication patents from Prowave Inc. These post-auction actions by Google and Intel can be understood as so-called working solutions (Walsh et al., 2003) .
The concept of working solution and the findings of the present paper jointly explain why there is mixed evidence of the detrimental impact of the patent holdup on innovation. Firms seek ways to cope with the increased risk as time goes on and, in doing so, the detrimental impact of the patent holdup on the firms' R&D activity is gradually mitigated.
Some may argue that LOSE -group firms could be protected from the detrimental impact of the auction in their R&D under the Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) regime, even if the WIN -group tried to utilize the LOSE -group's patent holdup risk. If the FRAND regime worked, LOSE -group firms should not have been affected by the auction result.
However, the FRAND regime is too vague to enforce in practice (Layne-Farrar et al., 2007; Larouche et al., 2014; Craig, 2013) . In practice, the benchmark royalty that is essential to find whether proposed licensing terms on the negotiation table are "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" is often not observable, because there is no incentive or legal requirement that mandate a firm's disclosure of their historical licensing terms in detail. In the absence of benchmark licensing terms, licensing negotiation under FRAND terms used to result in legal disputes. Given this limitation, utilization of FRAND might not be as effective as it is supposed to be.
The present study was focused on finding evidence of the negative externality of a firm's external patents acquisition on a rival's innovative outcomes. I suggest that a firm's new patents' acquisition through internal R&D can cause a similar effect, as many prior studies show that firms put effort into filing strategically valuable patents to hinder competitors' market operations. I believe that empirically examining whether firms' strategic patenting can increase the patent holdup risk for their rivals, thus negatively impacting rival firms' R&D activities, is a worthy research topic for future study.
Conclusions
The primary implication of the present study is that the market for patents is of a different nature than the market for technology. In the market for patents, firms may acquire external patents so they can strategically exploit their patent exclusion rights over their market competitors, which may increase ex-post patent holdup risk for these rival firms, consequently increasing their R&D cost.
On the other hand, the subject of transactions in the technology market are technological ideas.
Technology transactions essentially enhance social welfare by promoting the innovative division of labor and efficient allocation of technology to those who can do a better job in commercializing it.
This different nature between the market for patents and market for technology forces us to reconsider policies which aim at encouraging patent ownership transactions. These policies are based on the belief that an active patent market will bring the benefits of the technology market for innovation; this assumption needs careful reconsideration. We need to more thoroughly examine questions such as, when does active patent ownership transfer actually promote innovation? When does it generate patent holdup and unnecessary cost for innovation?
This study contributes to extending our understanding of the relationship between patents and innovation. Studies have conventionally discussed whether patents promote or hamper innovation, focusing on the tension between technological monopoly and incentives for innovation conferred by the patent system (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1969) . The present study untangles part of the puzzling relationship between patents and innovation by emphasizing the importance of taking into consideration who owns what patents, and whether the patentee is willing to use a patent for strategic purposes, such as manipulating competitors' market activities.
Firms can benefit from the present study. The finding that a firm's patent purchase affects its rival's R&D outcome suggests that firms need to carefully monitor not only rivals' patenting activities, but also be strategic about their own patent purchase activities. Identifying what patents are purchased by rival firms and examining whether such patents can impose holdup risk against their R&D as well as business operations can help to organize a more effective intellectual property strategy.
The findings in this study by no means imply that patent transfer does not serve as a channel for technology transaction, or that it only impedes innovation. The data and findings of this study do not allow such conclusions to be drawn. Whether patent transfer for strategic exploitation of the patent exclusion right generate more social costs than benefits, and how it affects "overall innovation" is a remaining question.
Like all research, this study is not without limitations. First, I have measured R&D outcomes of firms through their patenting activities. However, as many studies have pointed out, patents are not always a reliable proxy for firms' R&D outcomes. Not all inventions are patented (Cohen et al., 2000) . Patents used to be filed for strategic purposes (e.g., Ziedonis, 2004; Motohashi, 2008) , and there are many other reasons for filing patents than R&D (see, Morton and Shapiro, 2014) . Future studies may address this limitation by using alternative measures of R&D outcomes.
Second, although analyzing the case of Nortel's patent auction was useful for identifying the impact of patent ownership transfer, the conclusion drawn from this case is subject to external validity issue, as the finding is only based upon a single case. I hope future studies can bring more cases and add more insights to the conclusion of the present study.
Finally, the present study did not consider the role of regulatory authorities. When it comes to Nortel's patent auction, the redistribution of the patents to the three-member companies was the subject of sanction by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) because of the concern that the redistribution of patents might harm fair market competition. In 2012, the DoJ permitted the acquisition of the patents by the three-member companies, while forcing them not to exert the patents opportunistically 10 . Although how the DoJ's post-auction actions might have influenced the bidding firms' R&D activities with respect to Nortel's auctioned patents is not that clear, it is worthy of further investigation. Bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (Resampling size, N=1000) * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
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